
APT29
Also known as:IRON RITUAL · IRON HEMLOCK · NobleBaron · Dark Halo · NOBELIUM · UNC2452 · YTTRIUM · The Dukes · Cozy Bear · CozyDuke · SolarStorm · Blue Kitsune · UNC3524 · Midnight Blizzard
Overview
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes. Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.
Naming & attribution
APT29 is tracked under 15 names across the industry. It uses 66 documented ATT&CK techniques — more than 91% of the 174 groups tracked here. Activity attributed since at least 2008.
| Name | First reported by |
|---|---|
| IRON RITUAL | Secureworks CTU |
| IRON HEMLOCK | Secureworks CTU |
| NobleBaron | Guerrero-Saade, J |
| Dark Halo | Cash, D. et al |
| NOBELIUM | Nafisi, R., Lelli, A |
| UNC2452 | FireEye |
| YTTRIUM | Microsoft Defender Research Team |
| The Dukes | F-Secure Labs |
| Cozy Bear | Alperovitch, D. |
| CozyDuke | Alperovitch, D. |
| SolarStorm | Unit 42 |
| Blue Kitsune | PWC |
| UNC3524 | Mandiant |
| Midnight Blizzard | Microsoft |
| APT29 | F-Secure Labs |
Distinctive techniques
Techniques this group uses that are rare across the other 173 tracked groups — these carry more signal than the near-universal ones.
T1027.006HTML Smuggling — used by 1 of 174 groupsT1090.004Domain Fronting — used by 1 of 174 groupsT1098.005Device Registration — used by 1 of 174 groupsT1556.007Hybrid Identity — used by 1 of 174 groupsT1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates — used by 1 of 174 groupsT1685.002Disable or Modify Cloud Log — used by 1 of 174 groupsT1087.004Cloud Account — used by 2 of 174 groupsT1136.003Cloud Account — used by 2 of 174 groups
Closest groups by technique overlap
Computed from shared ATT&CK techniques. Overlap is not attribution — distinct actors converge on the same tradecraft — but a high share is a useful pivot.
- APT28 Russia — 29 shared techniques (22% overlap)
- TA2541 — 16 shared techniques (21% overlap)
- APT33 Iran — 16 shared techniques (20% overlap)
- Threat Group-3390 China — 20 shared techniques (19% overlap)
- Magic Hound Iran — 22 shared techniques (18% overlap)
- VOID MANTICORE Iran — 20 shared techniques (18% overlap)
Malware families with tracked indicators
One family attributed to APT29, with 323 deduplicated indicators observed across abuse.ch ThreatFox, MalwareBazaar, URLhaus and SSLBL over the corpus's window (up to three years, as of 2026-10-30). MITRE documents what a group does; these are the indicators its malware families have surfaced in that window.
- Sliver323 indicators
Browse or copy the indicators by hash, domain, IP or URL, filtered by age from 1 day to 3 years.
Targets
Government · Private sector · Think Tanks
Regions
Belgium · Brazil · China · Georgia · Germany · India · Japan · Kazakhstan · Mexico · New Zealand · Portugal · Romania · South Korea · Turkey · Ukraine · United States
Capabilities
- Exploitation of public-facing / client applications — ATT&CK T1190, T1203
- Custom malware/implant development — ATT&CK: 34 attributed custom malware families
TTPs — 66 techniques across 13 tactics
Reconnaissance
T1595.002Vulnerability Scanning
Resource Development
T1583.006Web ServicesT1586.002Email AccountsT1586.003Cloud AccountsT1587.001MalwareT1587.003Digital CertificatesT1588.002Tool
Initial Access
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1199Trusted RelationshipT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentT1566.002Spearphishing LinkT1566.003Spearphishing via Service
Execution
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationT1053.005Scheduled TaskT1059.001PowerShellT1059.006PythonT1059.009Cloud APIT1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionT1204.001Malicious LinkT1204.002Malicious FileT1651Cloud Administration Command
Persistence
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsT1037.004RC ScriptsT1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsT1098.005Device RegistrationT1133External Remote ServicesT1136.003Cloud AccountT1505.003Web ShellT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Privilege Escalation
Stealth
T1027.001Binary PaddingT1027.002Software PackingT1027.006HTML SmugglingT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationT1070.004File DeletionT1070.006TimestompT1078Valid AccountsT1078.003Local AccountsT1078.004Cloud AccountsT1218.005Mshta
Defense Impairment
T1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassT1556.007Hybrid IdentityT1685.002Disable or Modify Cloud Log
Credential Access
T1003.002Security Account ManagerT1003.004LSA SecretsT1110.001Password GuessingT1110.003Password SprayingT1528Steal Application Access TokenT1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationT1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Discovery
T1016.001Internet Connection DiscoveryT1087.004Cloud Account
Lateral Movement
T1021.007Cloud ServicesT1550.003Pass the Ticket
Collection
T1005Data from Local SystemT1114.002Remote Email Collection
Command and Control
T1090.002External ProxyT1090.003Multi-hop ProxyT1090.004Domain FrontingT1105Ingress Tool TransferT1568Dynamic ResolutionT1573Encrypted ChannelT1665Hide Infrastructure
Tools & malware (49)
PinchDuke · ROADTools · WellMail · CozyCar · Mimikatz · meek · TrailBlazer · Tasklist · OnionDuke · FatDuke · POSHSPY · EnvyScout · SoreFang · GeminiDuke · reGeorg · BloodHound · GoldMax · FoggyWeb · SDelete · PolyglotDuke · AADInternals · MiniDuke · TEARDROP · SeaDuke · Sibot · Raindrop · RegDuke · CloudDuke · GoldFinder · AdFind · PsExec · Tor · NativeZone · Systeminfo · ipconfig · SUNSPOT · Impacket · Cobalt Strike · PowerDuke · Net · QUIETEXIT · HAMMERTOSS · BoomBox · Sliver · CosmicDuke · SUNBURST · WellMess · VaporRage · LiteDuke
Reporting (3)
- How Microsoft names threat actors — Microsoft
- UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email — Mandiant
- Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign — CrowdStrike