
FIN6
Also known as:Magecart Group 6 · ITG08 · Skeleton Spider · TAAL · Camouflage Tempest
Overview
FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.
Naming & attribution
FIN6 is tracked under 6 names across the industry. It uses 40 documented ATT&CK techniques — more than 74% of the 174 groups tracked here.
| Name | First reported by |
|---|---|
| Magecart Group 6 | Villadsen, O |
| ITG08 | Villadsen, O. |
| Skeleton Spider | CrowdStrike |
| TAAL | Microsoft |
| Camouflage Tempest | Microsoft |
| FIN6 | FireEye Threat Intelligence |
Distinctive techniques
Techniques this group uses that are rare across the other 173 tracked groups — these carry more signal than the near-universal ones.
T1134Access Token Manipulation — used by 3 of 174 groups
Closest groups by technique overlap
Computed from shared ATT&CK techniques. Overlap is not attribution — distinct actors converge on the same tradecraft — but a high share is a useful pivot.
- FIN8 — 18 shared techniques (31% overlap)
- Silence — 16 shared techniques (31% overlap)
- menuPass China — 19 shared techniques (28% overlap)
- Wizard Spider Russia — 22 shared techniques (27% overlap)
- OilRig Iran — 24 shared techniques (26% overlap)
- Fox Kitten Iran — 16 shared techniques (25% overlap)
Malware families with tracked indicators
One family attributed to FIN6, with 3 deduplicated indicators observed across abuse.ch ThreatFox, MalwareBazaar, URLhaus and SSLBL over the corpus's window (up to three years, as of 2026-10-30). MITRE documents what a group does; these are the indicators its malware families have surfaced in that window.
- Maze3 indicators
Browse or copy the indicators by hash, domain, IP or URL, filtered by age from 1 day to 3 years.
Capabilities
- Custom malware/implant development — ATT&CK: 8 attributed custom malware families
TTPs — 40 techniques across 13 tactics
Resource Development
T1588.002Tool
Initial Access
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentT1566.003Spearphishing via Service
Execution
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationT1053.005Scheduled TaskT1059Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.001PowerShellT1059.003Windows Command ShellT1059.007JavaScriptT1204.002Malicious FileT1569.002Service Execution
Persistence
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Privilege Escalation
Stealth
T1027.010Command ObfuscationT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceT1070.004File DeletionT1078Valid AccountsT1134Access Token Manipulation
Defense Impairment
T1553.002Code SigningT1685Disable or Modify Tools
Credential Access
T1003.001LSASS MemoryT1003.003NTDST1110.002Password CrackingT1555Credentials from Password StoresT1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers
Discovery
T1018Remote System DiscoveryT1046Network Service DiscoveryT1087.002Domain Account
Lateral Movement
T1021.001Remote Desktop Protocol
Collection
T1005Data from Local SystemT1074.002Remote Data StagingT1119Automated CollectionT1213.006DatabasesT1560Archive Collected DataT1560.003Archive via Custom Method
Command and Control
T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolT1102Web ServiceT1572Protocol TunnelingT1573.002Asymmetric Cryptography
Exfiltration
Tools & malware (12)
FlawedAmmyy · GrimAgent · FrameworkPOS · More_eggs · Cobalt Strike · Windows Credential Editor · AdFind · PsExec · Maze · LockerGoga · Ryuk · Mimikatz
Reporting (3)
- How Microsoft names threat actors — Microsoft
- ITG08 (aka FIN6) Partners With TrickBot Gang, Uses Anchor Framework — Villadsen, O
- More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again — Villadsen, O.